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The
credit for introducing the "LABOURISATION" goes to BMS
only. It stressed that all categories of "employer" and
under the various industrial ownership, the labour of workers must
be evaluated in terms of shares and workers raised to the status
of shareholders contributing labour as the share. As a standard
bearer of Bharatiya culture the BMS proclaimed that surplus value
of labour is managed and deployed by employers (accountable to themselves)
under capitalistic order: by state (accountable to party) under
communistic order and by workers (accountable to the nation) under
Bharatiya order.
The
BMS declared THE ONWARD MARCH OF LABOUR along the following lines:
From
The
Master-Servant relationship
Through
A
Better Deal
Joint
Consultation
Joint
Management
Auto-Management
Participation
in ownership
To
Worker's
Ownership.
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Workers'
share ownership plan constitutes the major form of financial participation.
It is technically called as Employee Share/ Stock Ownership Plan
(ESOP). The scheme gives the opportunity to employees to own shares
in their own company. The concept of ESOP was originally developed
in 1967 by Louis Kelso, San Francisco lawyer and investment banker,
and author of books titled 'The Capitalist Manifesto' and 'How to
Turn Eighty Million Workers into Capitalists on Borrowed Money'.
His objective was to turn workers into shareholders. Kelso argued
that conventional capitalism is a closed loop financial system the
rich get richer and the poor get poorer. People, he said, get rich
not through wages and salaries but by owning shares in companies.
With ESOP workers are able to get a share in this gain.
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When
an employer adopts the ESOP, workers form a trust to buy and hold
their shares. This trust then borrows money from a bank to buy some
or all of the company's shares at fair market value. The trust hands
over the money to the employer in return for shares. For his part,
the employer guarantees the repayment of the borrowed money, and
settles it over a period of time by making contributions to the
Trust.
Why
should any employer do this? In the USA the most important reason
is that he gets major tax concessions. Contributions to the trust
to pay off the loan are considered by law to be deferred wages.
They can be deducted from the company's income, exactly as wages
are, before computing tax. Further changes in the law in 1984 have
made ESOPs even more attractive. Half the interest earned by banks
from loans advanced to buy shares is free of tax. Companies can
deduct as an expense dividends paid on shares held by ESOPs, yet
another advantage to the employer is that ESOP protects his company
from takeover by business rivals. Since shares are not owned directly
by workers but indirectly through the trust, they cannot be sold
freely in the stock market.
Because
ESOPs are so attractive to employers, workers and banks, the movement
has received an enormous boost in the USA. About 10,000 companies
have adopted the plan since 1974. On an average, workers hold about
20 percent of the shares in ESOP firms. And there are at least a
thousand firms where they hold majority shares.
The
ESOP shares are not individual property, which workers can freely
sell. The decision to own the shares is also not an individual decision.
The shares are owned by the trust Loans to buy shares are taken
by the trust. And it is through the trust that the employer makes
payments to clear the loan ESOP shares are thus owned by all workers.
Individual workers can sell their rights when they leave or retire,
but the trust usually buys them back.
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In
the first place, it is often considered to be a means of improving
motivation and productivity. It leads to greater commitment, lower
absenteeism and labour turnover, greater investment in firm-specific
human capital and reduced intra-firm conflict. In contrast to individual
incentives, financial participation is also likely to enhance teamwork
and a cooperative spirit, thereby facilitating improvements in work
organisation.
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Workers'
financial participation in enterprise results is hardly a new idea.
However, it has only recently captured the attention of economists
and policy makers, not only in industrialised countries but also
in economies in transition, particularly in Central and Eastern
Europe. Moreover, although financial participation has been widely
discussed at the policy level, little is known about the application
of financial participation schemes in practice.
A
clear distinction is made between the experiences of the industrialised
countries and those in Central and Eastern Europe. While companies
in the industrialised countries are actively promoting financial
participation schemes as an efficient and flexible payment system,
which can improve motivation and productivity, in Central Eastern
Europe financial participation is mainly linked to the privatisation
process.
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Some
countries have addressed the issues of financial participation in
a more comprehensive manner than others. In France and the United
Kingdom, the law envisages a variety of financial participation
schemes, with different tax incentives, which have recently been
extended. This support has attributed to the growth in the number
of financial participation agreements in the two countries. In the
USA a notable slow down in productivity growth after 1973 generated
increased interest in worker participation. A number of tax incentives
were, therefore, introduced mainly for deferred profit sharing and
ESOPs
Financial
participation in Eastern European countries is closely linked to
their privatisation processes, as illustrated by recent legislative
developments and government statements in favour of share ownership
schemes. In all these countries, the first stage of privatisation
is the transformation of state enterprises into joint stock companies,
in which workers' share ownership plays a central role. Hungary
is a typical example, which has implemented various forms of workers'
share ownership. Government encouragement has promoted the rapid
development of ESOPs in the privatisation process.
These
schemes are more decentralised in Japan, where financial participation
seems to be part of an overall management policy and is not, therefore,
promoted by legislation or other public measures. It is implemented
by the social partners, viz., employers, employees, unions and the
management at the plant level and is often developed along with
participation in decision-making, work sharing and internal labour
mobility.
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The
development of workers' financial participation depends on a series
of social, cultural and historical factors. This is confirmed by
the Japanese experience, which is characterised by a notable development
of ESOPs. In the absence of direct formal government support, this
appears to be principally due to cultural, industrial relations
and other institutional factors. ESOPs have been introduced by more
than 90 percent of the firms listed on Japanese stock markets and
by 60 percent of all corporations. The average stock held by each
employee through an ESOP was estimated at US $ 14,000 in 1988.8
In addition to ESOPs, cash based profit sharing bonuses account
for an amount equivalent to about 25 percent of total pay, making
Japan the country in which financial participation is most advanced.
97 percent of firms with 30 or more employees pay bonuses to their
regular staff twice a year In addition, more than 90 percent of
Japanese firms operate a deferred profit sharing scheme.9
The success of ESOPs and other forms of financial participation
in Japan can be understood on the basis of a number of factors.
Unique features of the Japanese Industrial Relations System are:
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a)
The Lifetime Employment System;
b)
The Seniority Wage System,
c)
The Enterprise Union; and
d)
The Bonus System
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The
first three characteristics are called the Three Sacred Emblems7
of Japanese labour policy
Lifetime
employment is a unique feature of the working of large Japanese
firms. It accounts for the exceptionally dynamic functioning of
a large section of Japanese industry. The system presupposes that
it is the employees that ultimately make the firm productive, creative
and respectable To Japanese management, guarantee of lifetime employment
to its staff is a sacred obligation. Lifetime employment means employment
till the employee attains the age of retirement which is normally
55 years but it is now being extended to 58 or W years Top level
executives have, however, no mandatory retirement age.
Lifetime
employment is not a legal or contractual obligation. And it is open
to the employee to leave the firm, which, however, is rare. There
is no legal restriction on the right of the employer to discharge
or dismiss an employee, which is rarely resorted to. Mainly large
firms adopt this system and about 30-35 percent of the total labour
force is covered by this system. But these employees may be described
as Japan's standing industrial army-the backbone of her economy.
Under this system, employment has emotional and moral implications.
Not only the employee but his family also develops an attachment
for the firm and the employee tries to serve the company to the
best of his abilities. The tangible advantages of the system are
now well recognised. Lifetime employment involves lifetime training
as well which facilitates innovation and which strengthens the urge
for excellence in work. Lifetime employment is described as one
of the corner stones of the industrial relations system in Japan.
Japanese
firms like Sony are introducing lifetime employment in their factories
even in the USA with great success. For instance, the rate of absenteeism
in the Sony factory in America is only 0.1 percent. American workers
in Japanese factories in the USA take interest in their work and
make valuable suggestions for improving productivity and quality.
Japanese management is equally effective in a totally different
American Culture.
The
second salient feature of Japanese industrial relations system is
the seniority wage system. The system guarantees that wages and
other benefits increase steadily from the time of appointment. This
is generally restricted to lifetime employees.
The
enterprise union system of Japan is found to be very useful in strengthening
the individual worker's ties to his firm. In Japan every enterprise
would have its own independent union. It ensures better mutual understanding
between union official and management.
The
Japanese firms pay their employees bonuses twice in a year. The
payment is based on the financial achievements of the firm and not
linked with the productivity of the workers. The system has three
great advantages:
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(a)
The workers become aware of the vital importance of the successful
functioning of their firm.
(b)
The Japanese workers tend to live within their monthly regular earnings
and the bonuses are mostly saved. This is one of the main reasons
why Japanese households save on an average 17 percent to 19 percent
of their annual income,
(c)
The bonuses represent a form of deferred payment, which enables
the firm to generate additional working capital.
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Apart
from the congenial and harmonious industrial relations climate,
there has been indirect public support for workers' financial participation
in Japan, as a means of preventing foreign takeovers of Japanese
firms
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Employers'
associations have usually supported enterprise level schemes introduced
on a voluntary basis, with the design of the scheme being left to
the discretion of the enterprise. They oppose any binding arrangement.
Employers usually consider financial participation as an important
element of human resource management for the purposes of improving
employee motivation and commitment. They have argued for the introduction
of tax incentives.
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There
is an impressive wide-ranging body of evidence for a positive association
between workers' financial participation and productivity gains
in the industrialised countries. In their survey of empirical results,
Weitzman and Kruse, in the most comprehensive book on this issue,
edited by Blinder find a degree of consensus, which is most unusual
in empirical research. The authors, from their survey of a wide
variety of case studies and attitudinal surveys conclude that profit
sharing schemes have a positive and significant effect on productivity.
Studies on European countries, recently surveyed in the Pepper report,
also concur in pointing to a positive association between financial
participation and productivity. This report led the Commission of
the European Communities to propose its recommendation on financial
participation.
In
Belgium, France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America
it is found that financial participation schemes tend to have been
introduced and grown particularly in large profitable export oriented
enterprises. In Japan it is found that the probability of a firm
introducing financial participation schemes is higher in companies
in which human resources are a more important factor in their success.
The results of a survey carried out among 140 Belgian enterprises
also emphasise the positive effects of financial participation on
workers' motivation. In Italy, a survey carried out on a sample
of 179 enterprises suggests that enterprises with financial participation
experienced a substantial (12 percent) increase in production following
the introduction of these schemes. Surveys undertaken in the United
Kingdom show that financial participation has made employees more
profit conscious and increased their sense of commitment to the
company. According to a survey undertaken in the former Czechoslovakia,
the impact of financial participation differs according to the type
of enterprise and category of worker. Workers' share ownership appears
to have a much greater effect on motivation in small firms. Workers
in small units can observe and evaluate the effects of their efforts
on the profits of their company. Technicians and other skilled employees
show greater interest in financial participation schemes and are
more prepared to work for lower wages for a certain period in order
to contribute to the future prosperity of their firm.
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A
greater level of concern by workers for the success of their enterprise,
as a direct result of their financial participation, can have the
effect of reducing conflict in the work place, increasing the identification
of workers with the enterprise and lengthening their time horizon.
This can be strengthened by measures to facilitate workers' participation
in decision-making. Several examples of the companies from industrialised
countries suggest that worker' financial participation schemes succeed
more often when they are combined with some kind of workers5
participation in management. Combination of financial participation
and increased employee responsibility has contributed to Japanese
economic miracle.
The
global experiences of Labourisation suggest that the different forms
and paths taken by financial participation depend largely on national
systems of industrial relations and the attitudes and bargaining
powers of the social partners.
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4
The Mondragon Cooperatives
The
Mondragon Cooperatives in Spain are famous throughout the world
as the most successful worker owned firms. The Mondragon has over
a hundred cooperatives with 20,000 members, producing refrigerators,
washing machines, computerised machine tools, electronic components
and automobile parts. The uniqueness of Mondragon lies in its ability
to combine democratic control with business efficiency. It ensures
continuous employment to its members. 45 percent of the profit is
credited to the capital accounts of individual employees, which
can be claimed only on retirement. One of the secrets of Mondragon's
success is that no firm is allowed to grow too big. When the size
of the individual firm is kept small, there is greater scope for
interaction and effective participation by ordinary workers.
4
Omak Wood Products
Omak
Wood Products, Washington is a successful employee owned company
under ESOP. The employees have borrowed $ 50 million to pay for
the buy out of business and to provide for working capital. They
decided to set aside 10 percent of their wages until the debt is
repaid. The company is performing well.
4
National Steel Corporation
The
National Steel Corporation (NSC) of the USA was a sick unit. While
buying shares in NSC the workers entered into an agreement with
the company, which provided for the workers' participation in management.
The representatives of the workers and management of NSC meet monthly
once regularly, to share information in the decision making process.
As a result, NSC, once a losing company has become a producer of
cheap and best quality steel products and prompt supplier in the
market. Thus, the employees have saved their own fortune and also
the fortune of the factory.
4
Tower Colliery
There
was large scale closing down of coalmines owned by government in
England and thousands of miners were retrenched. In the course of
privatisation process, Tower Colliery, a prominent coal mine in
England was taken over by its retrenched workers. 239 workers contributed
$ 8000 each out of their retrenchment compensation and successfully
bid reworking the mine again. The amount contributed by the workers
was the lion's share of the total amount needed. The mine is functioning
remarkably well. The colliery has signed a $70 million contract
to supply coal for another five years.
4
Precision Tool Production Ltd.
Videoton,
the largest Hungarian electronic telecommunications State enterprise
employing nearly 20,000 employees, was divided into 21 companies
in the privatisation process. Precision Tool Production Ltd. is
one among them. Its employees have contributed nearly 85 percent
of the capital, from their savings and loans. After the transformation
of the company, the employees spent their evenings or weekends working
in the factory to meet the demand. Within one year, the employees
not only paid back their loans but also were able to purchase the
land and buildings and machinery, which were still owned by the
state enterprise.
4
International Freight Transport Company
An
international freight transport company of Hungary, formed under
privatisation process, struggled to survive. So, the employees decided
to start a new company. They contributed 50 percent of the initial
capital and the remaining amount was contributed by the parent company.
The employees participating in this plan were particularly motivated
to preserve their jobs and improve the performance of the company.
Their expectations and hard work were crowned with success; they
were able to broaden their market share in spite of tough competition
and general recession. Within one year, its employees owned 90 percent
of the shares.
4
Chyne Agricultural Cooperative
This
agricultural cooperative in Czech Republic has successfully been
transformed into a joint stock company with 49 percent of its assets
offered to employees in the form of shares. This made it possible
to preserve the participatory principles of the cooperatives and
motivate the workers.
4
Agrokombinat Slusovice
In
the privatisation process, the cooperative Agrokombinat Slusovice
was transformed into a series of small and medium sized firms with
workers' share ownership and profit sharing. It led to improved
efficiency and diversification of the bio technological and microelectronic
production to meet the challenge of international competition. As
a result, the firm has managed to attract most of the highly qualified
workers.
4
Silesian Factory Kable
Silesian
Factory Kable is a polish firm. Its decision to sell the shares
to the employees at a 50 percent discount was quite successful,
with 76 percent of the workers taking advantage of this opportunity.
According to the management, this has improved the social climate
within the firm as well as industrial relations in general, despite
a slump in the polish electrochemical industry, which used to absorb
Kable's production.
As
a conclusion to this section, illustrative data are provided on
the scope and nature of financial participation in three Japanese
companies in different sectors.
4
Hitachi (Electronics)
The
company introduced an ESOP in November 1974. In August 1985, 34.8
percent of employees were participating in the plan. The average
stake of participants is JPY 1.2 million. In 1984, the company paid
the average employee JPY 0.517 million (2.65 months' regular pay)
as a summer bonus, and another JPY 0.548 (2.72 months' regular pay)
as a year-end bonus.
4
Hoya (Precision Engineering)
The
company introduced an ESOP in October 1970. In March 1985, 47 percent
of employees were participating in the plan. The average stake of
participants is JPY 2 55 million. In 1974, the company (currently
one of the top manufacturers of optical instruments in the world)
introduced a profit sharing plan with the explicit objective of
increasing productivity. Around 40-45 percent of the annual bonus
is linked to profits. The bonus represents 6-7 months' regular pay
and is clearly above the industry average both in terms of cash
and months of regular pay. Unions support the plan, and there is
a very thorough Joint Consultation Committee, which meets once a
month and has many ad hoc sub committees. Quarterly profit reports
are provided to the Joint Consultation Committee.
4
Mitsui Bank
The
company introduced an ESOP in August 1969. In 1985, 67.6 percent
of all employees were participating in the plan. The average stake
of participants is JPY 2.36 million. In 1984 the bank paid the average
employee JPY 0.915 million (3.25 months' regular pay) as a summer
bonus, and JPY 0.973 million (3.40 months' regular pay) as a year-end
bonus.
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Worker
owned firms are not as common in India as in Europe. There have
been several cases, in India, of workers of sick companies forming
cooperatives to save their jobs. Many of these cooperatives have
an impressive record of performance. Kamani Tubes in Bombay, New
Central Jute Mills in West Bengal and Jaipur Metals and Electricals
in Rajasthan have all been working successfully. While there are
also some cases of failure, the general experience is positive.
With the right leadership and financial support, workers have shown
that they can take over sinking firms and make them profitable.
Indian
achievements regarding employee ownership are small compared to
developments on many European countries referred earlier. A feature
of worker ownership in India is the indifference, and sometimes,
even hostility, of the trade unions. When the firm runs into problems,
the natural response of trade unionists is to demand nationalisation.
While this was an effective strategy some years ago, the government
now appears unwilling to take over sick firms. The government has
no clear policy on worker ownership. The CTUOs except BMS have no
faith in it. The indifference of unions and the government is mainly
responsible for the present condition in India.
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4
Kamani Tubes
Kamani
Tubes is a worker owned company located in Bombay. Before that,
the Kamanis, a well-known business family owned it. This company,
that makes brass rods and tubes for use in refrigeration and sugar
production was established in 1959. It was a leading firm till the
middle of 1970s, controlling 60 percent of the market. By 1985,
the trouble started due to misunderstanding among the members of
Kamani family and financial difficulties. Kamani family abandoned
the factory, as the quantum of loss was uncontrollable.
When
the owners abandoned, the independent union consisting 600 workers
approached banks, financial institutions and the state government
to help revival. None of them responded positively. The union then
formed a cooperative to take over the firm. Claiming that workers
could raise the share capital from their provident fund, wage arrears
and loans, the union filed a civil petition in the Supreme Court.
The court asked the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction
(BIFR) to examine the union's proposal. The BIFR gave a favourable
report, but by now the Kamanis had returned to claim the company.
In spite of the legal hurdles they created, the Supreme Court upheld
the workers' action. By the end of 1988 the shares were transferred
to the cooperative In addition to workers' contribution, the state
government sanctioned a sizeable grant.
Since
revival, the company has made good progress. Production, wages and
profit have gone up. The worker owned company pays annually around
Rs.3 crore as excise duty. ^ Thus reviving the company has been
beneficial to the government too.
4
Cooperative of Slag-Pickers
The
Tata Iron and Steel Company in Jamshedpur dumps its slag in low-lying
areas to level the land and reclaim it for use. The slag contains
bits of iron, which can be collected and sold as scrap. At one time,
the job was given to contractors who employed slag pickers at miserable
wages.
In
1979, the State Government formed a cooperative of slag-pickers,
with the sub-divisional officer as the chairman. The cooperative
was given the monopoly to pick slag. In the very first year the
cooperative achieved a turnover of Rs.3 crore. This staggering amount
was beyond anybody's expectations. Wages have gone up substantially.
The cooperative has taken up lot of welfare work with its own funds.
It continues to run smoothly.
4
Cooperatives of Iron Ore Miners
The
Open Cast Iron Ore mines of Dalli - Rajhera in Madhya Pradesh also
have successful cooperatives. These mines supply iron ore to the
Bhilai Steel Plant. About 7500 workers organised in seven cooperatives
are engaged in this task. Most of the workers have moved from the
nearby Bailadilla mines, which have been running out of ore. The
government has encouraged the formation of cooperatives to rehabilitate
these displaced workers. The cooperatives have been running successfully
in spite of competition from contractors who also operate in this
area. It has generated handsome surpluses for distribution among
members and funding welfare facilities. The best free primary school
in the town is run by this cooperative.
Although
the cooperatives have shown that they can operate successfully,
there is not enough support for them from the trade unions. A trade
union well known for its militancy has organised the contract labourers
in this area. The members of the cooperative are also members
of this union. Instead of encouraging the formation of more cooperatives,
the union has been demanding that the Bhilai Steel Plant should
take over all the mines in the area, including those managed by
workers.
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New
Central Jute Mill (NCJM) is a large unit having a work force of
8000 at present. There are 12 unions in the mill but surprisingly
all these unions got together to labourise the sick company. The
initiative was taken by BMS. The company has been running well despite
there being a slump in the jute industry. It has modernised its
^machinery and has diversified its products. It is concentrating
on the manufacture of enhanced quality products, which have a good
market abroad. The success of this venture shows that workers' initiatives
can overcome the problems faced by traditional industries. While
other jute mills are languishing, NCJM has improved its production
and the quality of its products.34 NCJM stands as a model
worker owned company and glorifies the achievements of BMS.
The
NCJM was incorporated in 1915. It is a large jute mill situated
at Budge-Budge in South Choubeez Parganas District of West Bengal
having 810 Hessian and 452 sacking looms besides 26 other looms
and 189 spinning frames. In 1955 two other jute mills viz., Albion
Jute mill and Lothian Jute mill were amalgamated with the NCJM.
In 1974-75 the company set up its own Machinery Manufacturing Division
inside its own premises. The company employed about 9735 persons
in Jute Division and 342 persons in Machinery Manufacturing Division
on permanent basis besides temporary workers. The total number would
be about 13,000.
In
September 1982, the company approached Industrial Reconstruction
Bank of India (IRBI) for financial assistance for its modernisation
- cum - renovation scheme at a cost of Rs. 244 lakh. It was agreed
that promoters would contribute Rs. 49 lakh and different financial
institutions such as IRBI, INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK of India
(IDBI), Industrial Finance Corporation of India (IFCI), and Industrial
Credit and Investment Corporation of India (ICICI) would share remaining
Rs. 195 lakh. The IRBI disbursed a sum of Rs. 64 lakh against its
commitment of Rs. 95 lakh against first mortgage debentures and
personal guarantee of Shri A. K. Jain (Promoter) but other financial
institutions cancelled their share on one or another plea.
Gradually
promoters became indifferent in investing further money in the company
and as a result due to fund constraint and for some other reasons
the company started becoming sick and as such it had to face lock
out for four times during 1982-87. Repeated lockouts, reluctant
promoter to inject money and continued losses of the company made
such a sombre situation that almost all concerns of the mills became
hopeless. The suffering of workers increased and most of them faced
starvation.
The
workers approached the left front communist led State government
several rimes and requested to nationalise the mill. The government
remained a passive onlooker. There are 12 unions of workers and
2 unions of Head office staff. All the unions, except BMS, belonging
to different political parties tried their best for re-opening of
the mills through their political leaders but the Government at
the centre and the State government of West Bengal expressed their
inability to do anything. The promoters, management and government
had no solution.
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